Click here and press the right key for the next slide.
(This may not work on mobile or ipad. You can try using chrome or firefox, but even that may fail. Sorry.)
Press the left key to go backwards (or swipe right)
Press n to toggle whether notes are shown (or add '?notes' to the url before the #)
Press m or double tap to slide thumbnails (menu)
Press ? at any time to show the keyboard shortcuts
In moral disengagement there is anticipation of self-inflicted punishment
which triggers reasoning
that influences moral intuitions and actions.
‘basic values are [...]outside certain practices of justification [...] basic values seem to be implemented in an emotional way’ (Prinz, 2007, p. 32).
‘moral reasoning is [...] usually engaged in after a moral judgment is made, in which a person searches for arguments that will support an already-made judgment’ (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 189).
Moral judgements are not ‘the conclusions of explicitly represented syllogisms, one or more premises of which are moral principles, that ordinary folk can articulate’ (Dwyer, 2009, p. 294).
Characteristically deontological judgments are preferentially supported by automatic emotional [processes], while characteristically consequentialist judgments are preferentially supported by conscious reasoning and allied processes of cognitive control’ (Greene, 2014, p. 699)
Why are moral intuitions sometimes, but not always, a consequence of reasoning from known principles?