The Puzzle of Moral Foundations Theory

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The Puzzle of Moral Foundations Theory

s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk

puzzle

Given that the evidence for cultural variation in moral psychology is at best weak,
and given that the theoretical argument for moral reframing is flawed,
why does moral reframing seem to work?

The scalar invariance and Lars-et-al puzzles are nicely complementary: if the first fails and the evidence *is* correct, then the second objection gets you.

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

4. ‘liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms.’

5. ‘exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’

The standard explanation. Only known to work if MFQ-based findings can be trusted. Which they cannot. (NB: THis doesn’t mean we can rule the explanation out, only that we have no reason to accept it.)

These authors also mention two further factors: fluency and source.

‘Why does moral reframing work? The primary explanation is that morally reframed messages are influential because targets perceive a “match” between their moral convictions and the argument’ (Feinberg & Willer, 2019, p. 4).

What drives the effects?

Could we explain the observed effects on attitudes and actions
without appeal to cultural variation in moral concerns
?

Hurst & Stern (2020) manipulated both message and source (conservative/liberal/neither).

Doesn’t this contradict what Feinberg & Willer (2013) found?

‘we wrote the conservatively framed message with language intended to trigger all five moral foundations [...]

it is possible that the references to harm and fairness we included in the conservative message were too reminiscent of the familiar liberal messaging [...]

This subtle outgroup (i.e., liberal) association may have weakened the overall appeals’

(Hurst & Stern, 2020, p. 9).

I.e.

Doesn’t this contradict what Feinberg & Willer (2013) found?

Fielding et al. (2020, p. figure 1)

Asked about support for carbon tax; then shown article about carbon tax being endorsed by either Rep or Dem; then asked again about support for carbon tax.

‘this is the first research to test whether messages about climate change that come from political ingroup members can positively influence responses to climate change policy.’ (Fielding et al., 2020).

Add a slide opposing this: ‘conservatives high in Fairness are more supportive of policies pro- posed by President Obama than liberals who are low in Fairness’ (Miles, 2016, p. 486). Can also use their figures!

Why does moral reframing work?

The primary explanation is that morally reframed messages are influential because targets perceive a “match” between their moral convictions and the argument in favor of the other side’s policy position’ (Feinberg & Willer, 2019, p. 4).

Evidence: Wolsko (2017)

Schuldt et al, 2017

‘A nationally representative survey of 1212 U.S. adults was fielded online by GfK (formerly KnowledgeNetworks) between April 15 and May 1, 2016, approximately 11 months after the release of the encyclical and 7 months after the pope’s U.S. visit.’

Results

‘Whereas a minority (46%) of respondents reported perceiving climate change as a moral issue in the control condition, this figure rose to 51% among those in the pope prime condition’ (Schuldt et al., 2017).

‘the pope prime exerted a stronger effect on the moral beliefs of Republicans: 30% of Republicans in the control group reported perceiving climate change as a moral issue compared to 39% of Republicans in the pope prime condition, X2(469) = 4.32, p = .04. By comparison, Democrats were equally likely to report perceiving climate change as a moral or ethical issue regardless of condition (61% vs. 58% in the treatment versus control group, respectively), X2 (662) = .57, p=.45.’

‘the pope prime exerted a stronger effect on the moral beliefs of Republicans

fluency. Perhaps MFT is not the right explanation and the difference is some more superficial cultural variation?

‘the persuasiveness of a message is enhanced when it fits with the observer’s mental representational state (Schwarz and Clore 1983). When encountering information that is consistent with their beliefs, values, and opinions, individuals are likely to experience a feeling of fluency or ease of comprehension, generating a “feels right” experience (Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman 2004). Similar to positive affect (Cesario, Grant, and Higgins 2004), in which individuals feel a generalized state of emotional arousal, fluency additionally engenders a feeling that something “just fits” by feeling genuine and desirable (Lee and Aaker 2004). Moreover, Kim et al. (2009) suggest that this feeling “right” elicits more favorable evaluations of a message because individuals misattribute their feeling-right experience to the quality of the persuasive message’ (Kidwell et al., 2013, p. .352)

Kidwell et al, 2013 figure 1

Fluency matters for

familiarity judgements

agency judgements

surprise judgements

...

fluency. Perhaps MFT is not the right explanation and the difference is some more superficial cultural variation?

Kidwell et al, 2013 figure 1

I was asking ...

Could we explain the observed effects on attitudes and actions
without appeal to cultural variation in moral concerns
(and so without invoking Moral Foundations Theory)?

To the extent we think fluency (and perhaps other cognitive factors) drive the effect, we might be agnostic about whether what lies behind fluency is a deep cultural difference or a relatively superficial divide in terms of how things are phrased in different groups.

puzzle

Given that the evidence for cultural variation in moral psychology is at best weak,
and given that the theoretical argument for moral reframing is flawed,
why does moral reframing seem to work?

The scalar invariance and Lars-et-al puzzles are nicely complementary: if the first fails and the evidence *is* correct, then the second objection gets you.

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