Conflicting Evidence against a Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgement

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Conflicting Evidence against a Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgement

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aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

evidence against the auxiliary hypothesis

‘Submarine (4/60)

You are responsible for the mission of a submarine [...] leading [...] from a control center on the beach. An onboard explosion has [...] collapsed the only access corridor between the upper and lower levels of the ship. [...] water is quickly approaching to the upper level of the ship. If nothing is done, 12 [extreme:60] people in the upper level will be killed.

[...] the only way to save these people is to hit a switch in which case the path of the water to the upper level will be blocked and it will enter the lower level of the submarine instead.

However, you realize that your brother and 3 other people are trapped in the lower level. If you hit the switch, your brother along with the 3 other people in the lower level (who otherwise would survive) will die [...]

Would you hit the switch?’

(Bago & Neys, 2019, p. ][supplementary materials)

Bago & de Neys, 2019 supplementary materials

first response under time pressure and cognitive load

second response under neither

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

prediction: first response will be less influenced by outcomes than the second

Because they did not vary the outcomes, this is tricky. (Save for later.)

First response vs second response.

Bago & de Neys, 2019 table 2

Study 1: lots of consequentialist responses (= U)

Can also compute ‘noncorrection’ rate for those responses whihc ended D (ie. DD/(UD+DD)). In this study it’s 69.3% I.e. proportion of switchers *to* D was higher than proportion of switchers to U!

Study 2: few consequentialist responses (= U) But still reversals are few.

Can also compute ‘noncorrection’ rate for those responses whihc ended D (ie. DD/(UD+DD)). Overall for all studies it’s 84.2% I.e. proportion of switchers *to* D was only 0.4% lower than to U!

‘Our critical finding is that although there were some instances in which deliberate correction occurred, these were the exception rather than the rule. Across the studies, results consistently showed that in the vast majority of cases in which people opt for a [consequentialist] response after deliberation, the [consequentialist] response is already given in the initial phase’

(Bago & Neys, 2019, p. 1794).

Bago & de Neys, 2019 p. 1794

Objection: consistency effects? No!

‘a potential consistency confound in the two-response paradigm. That is, when people are asked to give two consecutive responses, they might be influenced by a desire to look consistent [...] However, in our one-response pretest we observed 85.4% [...] of [consequentialist] responses on the conflict versions. This is virtually identical to the final [consequentialist] response rate of 84.5% [...] in our main two-response study (see main results).’

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

Suter & Hertwig, 2011 : yes

Bago & de Neys, 2019 : no

Suter & Hertwig, 2011 figure 1

caption: ‘Fig. 1. Average proportion of deontological responses separately for conditions and type of moral dilemma (high- versus low-conflict personal and impersonal dilemmas) with data combined across the fast (i.e., time- pressure and self-paced-intuition) and slow conditions (no-time-pressure and self-paced-deliberation) in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Error bars represent standard errors. Only responses to high-conflict dilemmas differed significantly between the conditions’

‘participants in the time-pressure condition, relative to the no-time-pressure condition, were more likely to give ‘‘no’’ responses in high-conflict dilemmas’

(Suter & Hertwig, 2011, p. 456).

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

Suter & Hertwig, 2011 : yes

Bago & de Neys, 2019 : no

Neither study observed the effects of manipulating outcomes

Cf Gawronski & Beer (2017, p. 365): ‘a given judgment cannot be categorized as utilitarian without confirming its property of being sensitive to consequences, which requires a comparison of judgments across dilemmas with different consequences. Similarly, a given judgment cannot be categorized as deontological without confirming its property of being sensitive to moral norms, which requires a comparison of judgments across dilemmas with different moral norms’

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

Wait. Isn’t this too quick!

Evidence Greene (2014) cites includes:

Suter & Hertwig (2011)
Trémolière & Bonnefon (2014)
Conway & Gawronski (2013)

Saw this last time.

Conway & Gawronsky 2013, figure 1

Note that if we just provide ‘incongruent’ dilemmas, we cannot distinguish all the different possibilities.

This is why varying the outcomes (which we do between congruent and incongruent dilemmas) is so important.

‘incongruent dilemma’ : kill one to save five lives (consequentialism says yes, deontology says no)

‘congruent dilemma’ : kill one to prevent a paint bomb from going off (consequentialism and deontology both say no)

Maybe people just prefer not to act when under time pressure?

Conway & Gawronsky 2013, figure 1

Gawronski et al, 2017 figure 1

Gawronski et al, 2017 figure 4

‘The only significant effect in these studies was a significant increase in participants’ general preference for inaction as a result of cognitive load. Cognitive load did not affect participants’ sensitivity to morally relevant consequences’

(Gawronski et al., 2017, p. 363).

‘cognitive load influences moral dilemma judgments by enhancing the omission bias, not by reducing sensitivity to consequences in a utilitarian sense’

(Gawronski et al., 2017, p. 363).

‘Instead of reducing participants’ sensitivity to consequences in a utilitarian sense, cognitive load increased participants’ general preference for inaction. ’

(Gawronski et al., 2017, p. 365).

Gawronski et al, 2017 p. 363

Evidence Greene (2014) cites includes:

Suter & Hertwig (2011)
Trémolière & Bonnefon (2014)
Conway & Gawronski (2013)

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

Suter & Hertwig, 2011 : yes

Bago & de Neys, 2019 : no

Can we resolve the apparent contradiction by preference for inaction under time-pressure?

I don’t see how. Both studies used nonconsequentialist = deontological. So any preference for inaction under time-pressure should have had the same effect in both studies!

These studies’ results appear to confict (time-pressure does/doesn't make people less consequentialist)

These studies’ results appear to confict (time-pressure has barely any effect / does make people less consequentialist [because prefer inaction])

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

Too early to give up on the dual-process theory altogether. We have no better account. But we should not be confident in the auxiliary hypothesis.

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Conflicting Evidence against a Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgement

[email protected]

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