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A Dual Process Theory of Ethical Judgement

[email protected]

please answer a dilemma first

https://moral-psychology-docs.butterfill.com/
docs/lecture_07/dual_process_ethics/

Start with a simple causal model.
‘response 1’ is a variable representing which response the subject will give. [Which values it takes will depend on what sort of response it is (e.g. a verbal response, proactive gaze, button press.) We can think of it as taking three values, one for correct belief tracking, one for fact tracking, and one for any other response.]
‘process 1’ and ‘process 2’ are variables which each represent whether a certain kind of ethical process will occur and, if so, what it’s outcome is.
And the arrows show that the probability that response 1 will have a certain value is influenced by the value of the variables process 1 and process 2 (and by other things not included in the model). So it should be possible to intervene on the value of ‘process 1’ in order to bring about a change in the value of ‘response 1’.
[I’ve used thicker and thinner arrows informally to indicate stronger and weaker dependence. Strictly speaking the width has no meaning and this model doesn’t specify exactly how the values of variables are related, only that they are.]

Dual Process Theory of Ethical Abilities (core part)

Two (or more) ethical processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.

One process makes fewer demands on scarce cognitive resources than the other.

(Terminology: fast vs slow)

Ok, that’s what the theory says. But what does it mean?
Actually we don’t need to consider more than one response for the present since there is no evidence concerning multiple types of response (alas!).
Further, the probability that responses of these two types track beliefs should be differently affected by factors such as time pressure and cognitive load. (It isn’t important that either is entirely unaffected; what matters is just that the effects are different.)
As far as I know we don’t yet have direct evidence for this, because few studies have compared what happens to two response types as factors like time pressure or cognitive load are varies. There is, of course, some evidence that responses of some types are less susceptible to cognitive load than others (e.g. Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson (2010) on L1 VPT).
Attempting to derive a prediction about cognitive load

Additional assumption

The slow process is responsible for characteristically consequentialist responses; the fast for other responses.

What are ‘consequentialist responses’? Those responses where a moral judgement that would be correct on a simple consequentialist theory.

Prediction: Increasing cognitive load will selectively slow consequentialist responses

Greene et al 2008, figure 1

time pressure study

Additional assumption

The slow process is responsible for consequentialist responses; the fast for other responses.

Prediction: Limiting the time available to make a decision will reduce consequentialist responses.

time pressure study

Trémolière and Bonnefon, 2014 figure 4

‘The model detected a significant effect of time pressure, p = .03 (see Table 1), suggesting that the slope of utilitarian responses was steeper for participants under time pressure. As is visually clear in Figure 4, participants under time pressure gave less utilitarian responses than control par- ticipants to scenarios featuring low kill–save ratios, but reached the same rates of utilitarian responses for the highest kill–save ratios.’ (Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014, p. 927)
***todo*** [save for later, more drama: [also mention (Gawronski et al., 2018) p.~1006 ‘reinterpreation’ and p.~992 descriptive vs mechanistsic]] Gawronski & Beer (2017, p. 669) argue for an alternative interpretation: The central findings of Trémolière & Bonnefon (2014) ‘show that outcomes did influence moral judgments, but only when participants were under cognitive load or time pressure (i.e., the white bars do not significantly differ from the gray bars within the low load and no time pressure condi- tions, but they do significantly differ within the high load and time pressure conditions). Thus, a more appro- priate interpretation of these data is that cognitive load and time pressure increased utilitarian responding, which stands in stark contrast to the widespread assumption that utilitarian judgments are the result of effortful cognitive processes (Greene et al., 2008; Suter & Hertwig, 2011).
So this is our dual process theory of ethical abilities.

Dual Process Theory of Ethical Abilities (core part)

Two (or more) ethical processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.

One process makes fewer demands on scarce cognitive resources than the other.

(Terminology: fast vs slow)

[Aside : camera analogy]

‘it’s worth highlighting three ways in which the camera analogy may mislead’

(Greene, 2014, p. 698)

Greene, 2014 p. 698

I.e. this is a misleading analogy for a dual process theory (and entirely unhelpful, I think).
process prioritycontent (physics)content (ethics)
fastutility over consistencyimpetusThomson-esque?
slowconsistency over utilityNewtonian???

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. We have reason to suspect that the moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider are unfamiliar situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

Tentative accept: have seen some evidence for it. Have not, however, fully evaluated the evidence. (And I think there are substantial questions about whether the evidence is sufficient for knowledge of this first premise.)